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Abstract 
 
In the vast domain of the internal market, ‘regulation’ is EU’s core business. Therefore, a good 
appreciation of European economic integration requires a sound analytical economic perspective 
of EU regulation. Since the Single European Act, economists have gradually improved the 
economic analysis of EU regulation. EU policy-makers began to accept cost/benefit analysis with 
the Maastricht treaty and nowadays the rigorous logic of Better Regulation and regulatory impact 
analysis has become routine in the EU circuit, although less with the EU legislator (EP and Council).    
 
The present BEEP Briefing provides an accessible survey of the state of the art of the evidence-
based, economic approach to EU Single Market regulation. This approach puts the subsidiarity 
test, proportionality and necessity on a firmer analytical footing and offers a healthy discipline of 
the precautionary principle. The acceptance of economic, evidence-based regulatory logic has 
caused a change of mind-sets in the European Commission: EU regulation is now routinely 
discussed in terms of incentives, asymmetries of information, multiple policy options (instead of 
going for a single one only), market-based instruments, quantification of benefits and costs, red-
tape alerts and cost-effectiveness. Last but not least, this also matters for national regulation. 
Given an ever deeper and wider internal market  than two decades ago, not to speak of the 
Eurozone, the regulatory autonomy of Member States has to be balanced against the possible 
consequences of undermining or preventing the ‘proper functioning’ of the internal market. The 
key words here are pro-competitive reforms and ‘diversity’’, based on distinct national 
preferences, yet minimizing costly ‘regulatory heterogeneity’ arising from decentralized decision-
making but without being rooted in genuine differences in preferences.  
 
Keywords: EU internal market, EU regulation, risk regulation, subsidiarity, proportionality, cost-
benefit analysis, precautionary principle, regulatory acquis 
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1. Introduction  
 
Establishing the European Union (EU) internal market and making it ‘function properly’ 
requires both EU regulation and changes in national regulation (whether adaptation, 
conditioning or removal). Together with the five economic freedoms, ‘regulation’ is the 
core business of the internal market. From the perspective of economic analysis, it is 
therefore desirable to place the economics of EU regulation at the centre of European 
economic integration studies.  
The purpose of this paper is to ‘map’ the economic analysis of two-tier EU regulation in 
the context of the internal market. The aim is to survey the essentials of the literature, 
without trying to be exhaustive. The structure of the chapter is as follows.  
Section 2 will make the case for a sound economic perspective of EU regulation in the 
context of the EU internal market under the heading ‘Why regulate the internal 
market?’.  
Section 3 will summarize a functional (i.e. economic) subsidiarity test for answering the 
question ‘at what level of government’ regulation ought to be issued, once the case for 
regulation has been correctly made. This is supplemented by the proportionality test, 
minimizing the cost of centralization while maintaining its benefits. Subsequently, two 
special issues are discussed: EU risk regulation (a very large part of EU regulation) and 
the precautionary principle. 
Section 4 will show that an analytical ‘mapping’ of the EU regulatory internal market 
acquis can easily be derived from the economics of EU regulation. It provides an 
economic underpinning of the notion that the internal market acquis communautaire 
broadly makes economic sense. 
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Section 5 takes a closer look at the quality of EU regulation. ‘Good’ regulation at the 
right level is likely to serve general economic welfare by providing correct incentives, 
overcoming market failure (but no more than that) and avoiding unnecessary 
regulatory burdens or red tape. The key words in this perspective include not only 
proper impact assessment and less ‘red tape’, but also variations of EU regulation such 
as mutual recognition and co-regulation. 
Section 6 discusses the vexed issue of the regulatory autonomy of the EU member 
states in an ever ‘deeper’ internal market, which is also widening in scope more and 
more. Two key words here are (national) market reforms and heterogeneity. Section  7 
concludes. 
2. Why regulate the internal market?  
 
The internal market of the EU combines negative and positive integration. Insofar as 
markets can fail, appropriate regulation or subsidies or some other policy intervention 
(like EU common policies) will have to overcome or remove the market failure at the 
common level of government. Of course, this assumes that the EU level of government 
(with all its complex decision-making) can act benevolently in the EU public interest. 
This contribution will not deal with EU public choice or ‘positive’ theories of regulation, 
or, for that matter, various political economy analyses.1 It will solely elaborate the 
‘public interest approach’ to EU regulation. In the first instance, it is based on the 
proper functioning of markets, that is, it is in the EU public economic interest to ensure 
the ‘proper functioning’ of the internal market (in turn, instrumental to pursuing the 
economic goals in the treaty) by overcoming or removing market failures.  
                                                     
1 The public choice approach as applied to the EU has been elaborated in particular with respect to the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the EU budget. See the contributions in Pelkmans, (ed.) 1986 and 
e.g. Vaubel, 1994a and 1994b. A rare example about the Single Market is Teutemann, 1990. The positive 
theory of regulation based on Stigler and Peltzman has been applied to the EU only occasionally. See e.g. 
Buchwitz, 1998. Political economy of EU regulation enjoys a huge literature e.g. Baldwin & Cave, 1999. A 
landmark study on the internal market is Egan, 2001. Principal-agent theories and their empirical 
verifications with respect to regulation, especially for (EU) autonomous Agencies, are also left out due to 
space constraints. Incentive structures and institutional design for (EU) regulation do matter. See e.g. 
Pollack, 2003, Majone, 2001 and Nicolaides, 2004. 
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Traditionally, economic theory distinguishes four broad market failures, with 
numerous differentiated manifestations. Guided by the authoritative survey of Spulber 
(1989), these four are: externalities and internalities, imperfections of competition and 
(EU) public goods. Definitions and basic examples are found in Table 1. 
Table 1: Market Failures: Definitions/Examples 
 
Kinds of market 
failure 
Definition Notes Examples 
 
1. Externalities 
Costs or benefits 
transmitted between 
economic agents, 
without an agreed 
transaction between 
them 
lack of 
compensations; 
missing markets; can 
be positive or 
negative 
environment, some 
health 
(contamination), 
some safety) 
 
2. Internalities 
Unexpected costs or 
benefits of 
transaction, not 
accounted for in 
contracts 
not a missing 
market,; rather 
imperfect 
competition due e.g. 
to asymmetry of info 
to consumers or to 
insurers; also, 
unobservable 
conduct 
relevant to many 
services and the 
(min.) quality of 
professionals; some 
labour; some health 
& safety 
 
3. Imperfections of 
competition 
deviations of 
effective competition 
due to market power 
or distortions 
 classic anti-trust + 
network industries; 
state aid controls, 
discrimination & non-
equivalence; market 
access; harmful tax 
competition 
 
4. Public goods 
characterized by non-
appropriability (of 
adequate revenues) 
and non-excludability 
(in consumption) 
if private, would be 
undersupplied or not 
supplied 
mainly, at member 
states’ level; at EU 
uniform system of EU 
law 
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In actual practice, it is far from easy to recognize a market failure from other market 
distortions, let alone, to identify the precise boundaries of the market failure. In most 
cases of market failures, however, government has to intervene. Yet, due to the 
imprecise nature and extent of market failures, regulatory intervention may well turn 
out to be too weak, too strong or otherwise not fully appropriate. Therefore, even if 
one strictly adheres to the EU public interest approach, there is nevertheless a risk, 
when regulating, of getting it wrong. The EU public interest will be badly served when 
market failures would be replaced by ‘regulatory’ or ‘government failures’.2 Moreover, 
in the EU internal market, a considerable complication is formed by its two or three 
tier governmental structure. The single market is governed by powerful EU treaty 
principles  and EU secondary legislation but also by the tier of Member States’ 
governments, responsible for implementation in national laws, for enforcement and 
for pre-empting or removing regulatory provisions which conflict with free movement 
or harmonized laws. For federal EU countries, a third layer may be relevant in case 
regions or provinces have regulatory power in areas which matter for the single 
market. Since centralization is costly (see Section 3), regulation should only be shifted 
to the EU level when alternative methods to address the market failure fall short of 
solving the problem. Another difficulty of multi-tier government is that some policy 
instruments remain exclusively reserved for national governments, in other words,  the 
EU level is unlikely to dispose of all the instruments. In the light of these difficulties, it 
is essential to assess the benefits and costs of proposed EU regulation or, ideally, even 
of established regulation in the EU acquis. Box 1 summarizes the proper economic 
framework for EU regulation in five consecutive steps. The case for ‘proportionally’ 
regulating the internal market is only helpful if one has an economically sound concept 
of the (EU) internal market itself. Economists tend to think in terms of market 
integration, a behavioural notion indicating that the activities of market participants in 
different regions or member states are geared to supply-and-demand conditions in all 
participating countries together. 
                                                     
2 There are different degrees of such ‘failures’ but the idea is that a regulation or intervention would be 
more costly (when all repercussions are taken into account) than the costs of the market failure itself. 
See for example Labory & Malgarini, 2000 for extensive discussion.  
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This ambitious definition implies that, ideally, local and national markets can only exist 
if transport or other ‘trade costs’ (including language and culture, but mostly 
fragmenting national regulation, distortions of competition, exchange rates, etc.) 
render it rational for economic agents not to extend their search for better price / 
quality. Otherwise, the relevant market would cover neighbouring markets as well or 
indeed the entire EU. This concept serves as a benchmark for long-standing attempts 
to measure the degree of price convergence over time.  
Box 1: Proper economic framework for EU regulation. 
Why intervene? 
• identify market failures and the benefits of their removal  
• if beneficial effects are non-trivial and 
• if market-based incentives or cooperative solutions are impossible 
At what level? 
• subsidiarity test 
• explicitly consider cooperative (but credible) solution among member states  
• consider two-levels solutions, if appropriate 
What instruments are available? 
• constraints at EU level 
• national or EU subsidies sometimes; or taxes at national level 
• usually regulation, including economic instruments 
Least-cost regulation 
• minimize costs of centralization 
• minimize degree of binding, where possible 
• consider different types of regulatory solutions 
Maximize net benefits 
• assess options as to effectiveness 
• use appropriate analytical tool (e.g. models, cost-benefit analysis, etc..) 
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There are numerous empirical problems surrounding such a measurement 
(Commission of the European Communities, 1988; Engel & Rogers, 2004; Ilzkovitz, 
Dierx, Kovacs and Sousa, 2007), not least that of measuring prices of services, but at 
least in goods and capital there seems little doubt that the EU internal market has 
prompted long-run trends of price convergence over time. There is another empirical 
tool that reflects the economic concept of market integration, namely, ‘home bias’. In 
the words of Delgado (2006), greater market integration has to show up in the extent 
to which ‘… economic decisions have become less domestic and more European’, in 
other words, a single market in the pure economic sense should have no ‘home bias’ at 
all. This paper will not survey the ‘home bias’ literature (Head and Mayer, 2000; Nitsch, 
2000; Chen, 2004; Delgado, 2006; Balta & Delgado, 2009) but the two central 
conclusions so far would seem to be: (1) home bias is found to be ‘high’ in the EU 
(there is still a strong national bias in the economic transactions of agents), (2) but it is 
clearly declining over time – deepening reduces ‘home bias’.  
Nevertheless, being successful in the EU internal market is tough. This could be due to 
local incumbents having market power, to local regulations and other forms of (tacit?) 
discrimination, to ‘missing links’ in EU infrastructure (especially, cross-border), to 
subsidies, other transaction costs like languages and local habits and/or to significant 
asymmetries of information between market players.3 A powerful (though indirect) 
confirmation of this fundamental problem is given in Mayer & Ottaviano, 2007, 
showing that a very large majority of firms in the EU does not actively participate in the 
internal market.4  
All this empirical economic research therefore goes to show that EU market 
integration is still far below (the economist’s) standard.  
                                                     
3 Combes, Lafourcade & Mayer, 2005, show empirically that trade and business networks can harden 
preferences to deal with selected (national) partners, due to trust, knowledge and lower transaction 
costs.  
4 Note that, of course, these ‘local ‘ firms do experience the internal market via import competition and 
establishment by companies from other EU countries and this may well induce pro-competitive 
behaviour on their part as well. See also Barba Navaretti, Bugamelli, Schivardi, Horgos and Maggioni, 
2011, for a more detailed follow-up. 
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Consider Figure 1, the internal market diamond. This ‘diamond’ is of conceptual help 
when developing a generic approach to (EU) regulation for the five types of ‘markets’ 
at stake (that is, goods, services, capital, labour and codified technology). A properly 
functioning internal market requires both negative and positive integration. Negative 
integration is called here (cross-border intra-EU) ‘liberalization’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Positive integration primarily consists of ‘regulation’ based on the key approximation 
article (now art. 114, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)) and 
competition policy in the wide sense (anti-trust, state aid regime and an appropriate 
network industries’ regime).  
A clever combination of regulation and liberalization is formed by ‘mutual recognition’, 
ensuring free movement whilst leaving (constrained) national regulation in place, 
without imposing EU regulation. The diamond shows that regulation is paramount for 
the proper functioning of the internal market, but it is not the only determinant.  
liberalization 
(free 
movements, 
establishment) 
 
mutual 
recognition 
PROPER 
FUNCTIONING  
IM 
competition 
policy 
regulation 
(approx.; common 
policies) 
 
Figure  1: A Properly Functioning Internal Market 
Regulation as one of the determinants. 
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There is a lot left implicit in the diamond, such as the great variety of regulatory tools 
at EU level,5 the implications for national regulation under art. 114, TFEU, the 
institutions for EU regulation including autonomous (but not independent) EU 
regulatory Agencies and the regulatory influence of common or quasi-common EU 
policies.  
Finally, when applying the analytical fundamentals, there is the danger of aligning 
internal market regulation with the factual organization of ‘the internal market’ in EU 
institutions. The latter fail hopelessly in their single market work to organize 
themselves on the basis of a sound overall economic and strategic concept of the EU 
internal market. Some 15 Directorate-Generals (DGs) of the Commission deal with 
‘the’ internal market, without a lead Commissioner, and/or without a thorough 
compatibility test with such a sound conceptual design which every DG should have to 
make at all times.6 
3. Regulation, subsidiarity and proportionality 
 
3.1.   Subsidiarity and proportionality: why and how to centralize regulation? 
The bottom-up development of European integration (starting from low stages of 
economic integration) naturally leads to the question: ‘what ‘integration deficits’ the 
internal market still suffers from and what EU regulation (or other intervention) would 
be needed to remedy this?’. In contrast, the economics of federalism assumes a single 
country from the beginning, prompting the opposite question: ‘what public economic 
functions can be decentralized in the pursuit of higher welfare for the federation?’  
                                                     
5
 From EU ‘regulations’ by Council & European Parliament (EP), to directives, decisions, comitology 
regulations, co- and self regulation, links to private law (e.g. product liability; counterfeiting) or to penal 
law (e.g. counterfeiting; environmental infringements; anti-trust) and various instances of ‘soft law’. 
6 The Monti Report (Monti, 2010) rightly observes this anomaly, too, and rightly underlines that it is 
little better in Council and EP, but fails to propose meaningful solutions.  
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These two contrasting perspectives have to be reconciled in the process of European 
integration, once the aspiration is changing to the attainment of stages much higher 
than a customs union or a customs-union-plus.  
Although the economics of federalism deal primarily with the assignment of the three 
basic public economic functions (allocation, or, market functioning; redistribution; 
macro-economic stabilization) to the two levels of government, or of the provision of 
public goods (Bureau & Champsaur, 1992; Oates, 1999), for present purposes, it is 
narrowed down to the assignment of regulatory powers. What the subsidiarity 
principle essentially reflects is the acceptance of ‘centralization’ of (here) regulation if, 
and only if, welfare in the EU would be lower (ceterus paribus) when keeping a 
decentralized assignment of that type of regulation. If welfare would not decrease, 
decentralization is preferred. Thus, it links the assignment of regulatory powers to the 
EU level directly to the economic welfare potential (cet. par.) of the internal market. 
Therefore, this approach accords well with the economic framework for (EU) 
regulation as set out in Box 1.  
The juxtaposition of the case for decentralization and that for centralization has now 
become well-established in the literature (CEPR, 1993; Oates, 1999; Pelkmans, 2005; 
Ederveen, Gelauff & Pelkmans, 2006; Gelauff, Grilo & Lejour, 2008).  The economic 
case for decentralization begins with the finding that all-out centralization is clearly 
sub-optimal, unless extreme assumptions would be met: all preference sets of voters 
would have to be congruent and information at the central level about regional needs 
and constraints would have to be ‘complete’. This is of course totally unrealistic. 
Although this is indeed unrealistic, it does not necessarily follow that decentralisation 
is superior. Preferences at local level need not be homogeneous. The locality may be 
as heterogeneous as the nation. In addition, you need to assume that politicians at the 
local level are not more easily “captured”.  Decentralization will tend to increase the 
welfare of voters for two reasons: (a) local governments ‘read’ local preferences better 
than in the centre, (b) local governments respond more effectively to locally revealed 
preferences.  
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Again, this assumes that the only relevant factor is that there is better info at the local 
level. But effectiveness also presupposes existence of the requisite capacity at local 
level. Voters will appreciate their politicians being close(r) to them and better satisfy 
their preferences. Thus, in federations or in the EU, there will often be costs to 
centralization. 
The economic case for centralization is about overriding reasons to centralize. Again, 
the case rests on the promotion of economic welfare. It starts with the finding that 
regions / countries are economically interdependent (indeed, even more so due to 
integration) and that various policies have very different, at times very high, costs. The 
interdependencies tend to cause positive and negative cross-border (intra-EU) 
externalities, which can only be properly internalized at a higher level of government. 
When desirable policies have extremely high costs, the average costs can fall 
considerably when going for joint policy making in a larger group. The classical case is a 
defence alliance like NATO or large scale EU infrastructure projects like GEANT and 
GALILEO or nuclear research in Euratom.  
The subsidiarity principle brings the two perspectives together: respecting national  
preferences where possible as well as the national capacity to respond effectively to 
nationally revealed preferences, on the one hand, and the need to internalize cross-
border spill-overs and to decrease the average costs of agreed policies. Subsidiarity is 
thus fundamentally a two-way principle: applying the principle can lead to (more) 
centralization or to (more) decentralization. What the (functional) subsidiarity test 
does is to centralize only if a stepwise economic justification is provided. Table 2 
provides the test. For shared powers, first, a need-to-act-in-common has to be 
provided, based on spill-overs and/or scale. Even if this ‘need’ is convincingly 
demonstrated, step 3 consists of a search for an inter-member states cooperative 
solution, as long as it is credible and durable. 
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Table 2: EU Subsidarity Test 
Step 1: verify whether the issue at stake 
falls under shared or (EU) exclusive 
powers 
If exclusive, the treaty rule cannot be 
undone by the test.  
If shared, the test can be applied. 
Step 2: the ‘need-to-act’ in common; is 
regulation at national level ineffective or 
too costly because of scale or 
externalities (the two criteria)? 
If one criterion (or both) applies (apply); 
there is a ‘need-to-act’ in common 
Step 3: can the common action avoid 
centralization at EU level? For example, 
by cooperative action among some or all 
member states, or by coordination, or by 
jointly accepting constraints on national 
regulation. 
Non-centralized common action retains 
some national powers, hence is 
preferred, provided it is  
 feasible 
 adequate 
 durable. 
If not, non-centralization is not credible 
to market players and will not solve the 
issue, while inducing costs (e.g. 
uncertainty) 
Step 4: centralization at EU level is 
justified if step 3 is not credible. 
 
 
It is therefore up to the member states to come up with credible arrangements which 
can overcome market failures (including too costly regulatory fragmentation), via (say) 
joint (national) model laws or cooperative ‘compacts’ (a US mode of solving spill-overs 
without federalization) or otherwise. If not credible, step 4 will imply EU 
‘centralization’. Nevertheless, when assigning to the EU level, the idea of subsidiarity is 
to centralize ‘not more than necessary’ for achieving the objective(s): the EU 
‘proportionality test’. Proportionality in EU law is always about regulating ‘no more 
than necessary’. Once the subsidiarity test yields the conclusion that regulation should 
be assigned to the EU level given the benefits, proportionality is applied so as to 
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minimize the costs of this centralization. A classical illustration is the shift from the Old 
to the New Approach of technical harmonization. In the old, heavy-handed EU goods 
regulation of the 1970s and 1980s, proportionality could mean partial or optional 
harmonization, although this menu fails to truly integrate the internal market. Yet, 
regulating everything under heavy-handed regulation (Old Approach) is very costly.7 
The better (New) approach is to opt for a different regulatory strategy – focused on 
common objectives (which overcome the market failures) - and ensure a co-regulatory 
system with the European standard bodies under strict guarantees, certification (under 
quality obligations) and EU accreditation of the certification bodies. This regime is far 
more flexible, more market driven and nevertheless attains the objectives set in EU 
directives; it expresses the idea of proportionality well. All in all, the subsidiarity 
principle together with proportionality boils down to nothing else than carefully 
juxtaposing the costs and benefits of (de)centralization.  
3.2.   EU Risk Regulation and Proportionality 
Risk regulation has moved more and more to the EU level and its proportionality is 
critical to the proper functioning of the internal market, especially of goods and 
services. Most of the EU internal market regulatory acquis consists nowadays of risk 
regulation. A convenient shorthand for risk regulation is SHEC: (EU) regulation about 
safety, health, environment and consumer protection goals.8 SHEC regulation concerns 
mostly goods and services markets, with occasional excursions to labour and capital 
markets too. In goods it covers the vast domain of health and safety regulation (from 
cars and tractors, to chemicals, pharmaceuticals (including pesticides and fertilizers), 
electronic products (with many standards ‘behind’ relatively few directives), plant 
health and animal health/welfare rules, food law, machines (with many standards 
behind relatively few directives), etc. In services, all safety rules and inspections in six 
modes of transport, the complex area of financial market regulation and supervision 
                                                     
7
 Examples include the 55-plus car directives and 23 tractor directives, which require continuous 
updating (as they are so specific and detailed) and entail static and dynamic implementation costs.  
8 
More precisely, SHEIC, if one wants to identify separately investor protection regulation 
 (and supervision). The text will employ ‘SHEC’; the ‘I’ of investor regulation in SHEC is subsumed in the 
‘C’ of consumers, widely defined. Also ‘savers’ can be subsumed in this ‘I’.  
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(which extends to financial capital and corporate governance), professional services 
regulation (including entry, hence, mutual recognition of diploma’s), network industry 
aspects (incl. externalities, access issues, market power vertically, etc.) in e.g. gas & 
electricity, rail, telecoms and broadcasting and regulation of many other services. 
More horizontally, it includes the enormous ‘acquis’ of environmental regulation from 
water, soil pollution, air pollution to climate related rules (and the ETS) and packaging 
as well as e.g. end-of-life of car (and electronic goods) rules. Finally, it includes 
horizontal consumer protection and consumer rights (e.g. across borders in e-
commerce).  In labour markets, occupational health and safety laws (largely at EU level 
as well so as to avoid distortions in the goods and services markets for which labour 
costs is an input) is relevant.  
It is crucial to see why such a huge regulatory terrain can endanger the good working 
of the internal market. The menace is overregulation, regulatory failures by too 
intrusive, rigid or otherwise costly regulation and by covering an unjustifiably wide 
spectrum of goods markets (that is, where few if any societal benefits can be 
expected). This danger has to be weighed against the benefits of overcoming possible 
failures of the internal market when sticking to national, diverse rules and, following 
the subsidiarity test, opt for common regulation. Most of the rules – and, by definition, 
the standards behind them – boil down to technical regulation, with all the 
asymmetries of information that it implies. SHEC regulation entails almost unlimited 
opportunities to bend the rules towards certain players. It might incorporate high 
requirements (always in the name of ‘safety’ or ‘health’, etc.), in business strategies 
known as “raising rivals’ costs” (thereby raising barriers to entry and enlarging the 
scope for higher profits (Church & Ware, 2000, 625-42). It risks – erroneously - to 
merely accumulate at the EU level all the prior requirements at member states’ level 
(as the Old Approach typically did, due to vetoes) and to engage in prescribing specific 
technical solutions as ‘safe’, thereby (re)creating regulatory barriers for third countries 
and neither allowing a cost/benefit analysis nor flexible options.  
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Ensuring proportionate EU regulation in overcoming market failures (including 
excessive fragmentation of the internal market) is a function of the risks involved. 
When risks are moderate but do justify regulation, the New Approach has 
demonstrated how to combine EU SHEC objectives (and it is regulatory objectives, not 
technical details, which are critical to overcome SHEC-type market failures) with a 
highly flexible, cost-minimizing regime of EU co-regulation. This regime consists of 
relatively ‘light’ directives (primarily about these common objectives, complemented 
by some common principles, the layers of conformity assessment when using 
European standards and some administrative arrangements plus a safeguard clause). 
The approach hinges on free movement and mutual recognition (where applicable) 
and the mandated European standards fully aligned with the directives’ SHEC 
objectives (Pelkmans, 2007 and Pelkmans, 2009). In writing European standards, 
private players have strong incentives to bring their knowledge and capabilities to the 
table, and so obtain access to a huge internal market, but they are bound by the 
objectives, the strong preference for ‘performance’ (rather than restrictive ‘design’) 
standards, a set of principles (compatible with the World Trade Organization (WTO)) in 
a Memorandum of Understanding with the EU and the quality requirements of EU 
conformity assessment.9  
When risks are higher, command-and-control (though costly) may well be justified 
since the benefits of strict regulation consist in pre-empting severe damage to 
consumers, workers or animals. Effects may often show up in indirect and complex 
ways (e.g. in the food chain or in complicated products, etc.). In high risk goods, one 
needs to be much more certain that hazards are drastically reduced to a level tolerable 
for society. The Old Approach in goods and for transport (equipment) assumes a more 
interventionist slant, with less or no scope for voluntary standards and often with a 
major role for public controlling authorities. Meanwhile, the Old Approach has been 
made less rigid and more coherent, thereby reducing unnecessary costs without giving 
up SHEC objectives. Examples include the regulatory acquis in cars and trucks (now 
                                                     
9
 Certification bodies have to be accredited with the EA (= European system for Accreditation). See Reg. 
765/2008, OJEU L 218/30.  
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aligned with the world regulatory regime run by the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe) and Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation & Restriction of 
Chemicals (REACH) and its EU Agency (ECHA) for chemicals, as well as the EU Agencies 
for air transport safety (EASA), maritime safety (EMSA) and railways (ERA) together 
with their underlining rules. Similarly, enormous progress has been made in areas like 
EU food regulation (with a mixture of the Old and New approaches, and an EU Agency 
[EFSA, primarily for risk assessment]) and that for medicines (with EU Agency EMEA).  
EU Environmental and consumer protection regulation are slightly different. The 
former has steadily moved away from its prior emphasis on command-and-control 
methods to ‘market-based’ instruments, with the most prominent example being the 
ETS, the EU emission trading system. The cost differential of the latter with rigid and 
prescriptive rules is large, whilst the same benefits are ensured a priori because 
emission caps (reflecting the objectives) are pre-set, indeed, have to be pre-set as a 
prerequisite for trading and carbon pricing to work. Where environmental rules are at 
stake, or where environmental and health/safety regulation overlap like in REACH, a 
profound problem is posed by the treaty obligation to apply the precautionary 
principle, which will be dealt with in Section 3.3. Consumer protection rules at EU level 
have often been hindered by the attachment of local consumer organizations to their 
local solutions and preferences (e.g. about what can be advertised and how, and what 
not), not least because much is covered by private law that remains national. The 
upshot is an unnecessarily costly fragmentation of consumer regulation, which reduces 
internal market gains, discourages Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (SMEs) to go 
‘Europe’ and undermines e.g. cross-border e-commerce between firms and consumers 
(B2C) as well as between consumers directly (C2C).  EU risk regulation is also the most 
important domain when it comes to regulatory impact assessment (RIAs) at EU level as 
elaborated in Section 5.  
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3.3.  The precautionary principle and proportionality 
Art. 191, 2 TFEU specifies four principles on which EU environmental policy and 
regulation ought to be based: the precautionary principle, that of prevention, 
environmental damage be rectified at source and ‘the polluter pays’. The policy shall 
aim at ‘a high level of protection’. Whereas the latter three principles do not present 
special problems for good EU regulation in an economic sense, the combination of the 
precautionary principle and ‘a high level of protection’ is very problematic indeed.  
The precautionary principle (PP) in the EU is usually traced back to an operational 
approach engineered by the Commission: ‘ *PP should be applied in case +… scientific 
evidence …* about the + safety of a product or action is found insufficient, inconclusive 
or uncertain…* and when + … reasonable grounds for concern that …* effects on 
environment & health ] may be inconsistent with the high level of protection chosen 
by the EU’.10 There can be no doubt that in some rare instances PP might be justified, 
even if such ‘justification’ would be surrounded by unusually great uncertainty. The 
most critical issue in ‘risk management’ by authorities is presumably ‘irreversibility’. 
Cases that come to mind might include climate change, BSE disease (in its early stages) 
and e.g. nuclear radiation. Nevertheless, the other three basic principles may go quite 
far in containing the hazards and the question then becomes how and how far PP 
ought to be applied in EU regulation. However, in the overwhelming majority of 
instances, one should be extremely prudent about the application of PP in EU 
regulation, for fear for huge regulatory failures lowering economic welfare in the 
Union. There are at least three reasons for this circumspect approach. First, PP ignores 
opportunity costs: could the resources directly or indirectly employed in living up to 
PP-based regulation not be better spent on other regulatory issues or on other 
priorities, especially for developing countries? Second, PP lacks operational clarity for 
setting targets unambiguously. This is problematic enough in and by itself but, given 
such ambiguity, it attracts interest groups eager to frame their positioning in terms of 
                                                     
10
 COM (2000) 1 of 2 February 2000, on the precautionary principle. The UN Rio Declaration of 1992 
speaks about using PP where ‘… there are threats of serious and irreversible damage, lack of full 
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent 
environmental degradation…’.  
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PP and this can lead to curious coalitions imposing high costs on society (Vogel, 1995). 
Third, the vague operationalization of PP will cause different countries with different 
levels of development and/or preferences to opt for distinct levels of ambition, 
generating multiple ‘standards’ in the WTO and a threat to open world trade in the 
relevant goods or services.  
In the risk assessments preceding RIAs, it is frequently the case that scientific evidence 
is ‘insufficient, inconclusive or uncertain’; this is inherent to science and its application. 
There is no such thing as scientific certainty. The idea of being ‘better safe than sorry’ 
is not capable of discriminating ‘how safe’ one wishes to be or when exactly one feels 
‘sorry’. An essential notion in the economics of regulation is that, beyond a threshold 
of SHEC–type risk reductions, further risk reduction rapidly becomes extremely costly. 
What marginal costs for what marginal gain are justified when uncertainty is so 
extreme? Also the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) Pfizer case11 has 
shown that PP in the EU must be limited to ‘real risk’, proportionate with the goal and 
– despite all difficulties – accompanied by a RIA. In other words, an important idea 
behind the economics of regulation – ‘evidence based’ regulation – should not be 
sacrificed on the altar of PP.12  
In the EU, genetically modified organisms (GMO) regulation and (e.g). REACH are 
based on PP. REACH has brought out what the dangers can mean in actual practice i.e. 
hazards rather risks becoming the basis for EU regulation. Basing regulation on hazards 
rather than risks is usually tantamount to a regulatory failure. A hazard is the potential 
for a substance, activity or process to cause harm or adverse effect whereas a risk 
combines the probability and the severity of a substance, severity or process to cause 
harm (Lofstedt, 2011). Thus, a chemical substance might have a potential to cause 
cancer (a hazard) and nuclear radiation might inflict deadly harm or cause diseases or 
                                                     
11
 Case T-13/99 Pfizer Animal Health, 2002 ECR II-3305. 
12
 Majone (2002, pp. 96-7) gives a telling quote from CJEU Advocate General Lenz who saw a finding of a 
consumer anti-preference as sufficient justification (!) and scientific evidence was seen as unnecessary. 
In Gollier, 2001, it is shown that strongly pessimistic views on vaguely known risks could have led to a PP 
application in the UK to BSE with truly absurd costs. Rather than the actual 0.5 per cent of GDP that it 
has probably cost Britain to solve the BSE crisis, one might have ‘consumed’ far beyond 10 % of GDP.  
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failed pregnancies for more than one generation (idem). If one were to base regulation 
merely on such hazards, (EU) regulation would become unnecessarily restrictive. 
Unnecessarily, because the actual danger to persons (or animals) is determined by risk. 
Going from hazard to risk identification is done with the help of an accepted 
international standard: once the hazard is scientifically established, the dose/response 
relationship is found (the dose to f. i. a human body), the likely exposure or indeed 
tolerated exposure is identified, and these together determine the risk. Thus, when 
miniscule quantities of a potentially harmful chemical substance are found in human 
blood, far below volumes that might cause any harm, the risk is very low for  the given 
harm. Exposure might be extremely low because chemical substances are trapped in 
solid rather than liquid or gaseous states as part of a product. Or, exposure might be 
very low because a chemical might only be used inside a controlled laboratory 
environment. Driven by a hazard-inspired approach of PP, at first the Commission early 
draft proposal was to subject all chemical substances to testing even when quantities 
used (hence, exposure risks) were minimal. Such a hazard-based approach is in conflict 
with principles of impact assessment where risks, not hazards, are related to SHEC-
type objectives (and market failures) (Lofstedt, 2011). In the final proposal for REACH 
(in October 2003) the Commission significantly raised the quantity threshold (in other 
words, it shifted more to a risk-based approach) with the result that the estimated 
costs suddenly were reduced by more than 80 per cent! In the same proposal the 
benefits of REACH turned out to be hardly known – only a very simplistic back-of-the 
envelope calculation was presented – although the new REACH approach in chemicals 
regulation should have been considered if, and only if, benefits can be specified at 
least indicatively. Why otherwise regulate in the first place?  
These experiences – and other ones (Wiener & Rogers, 2002 on the US experience) - 
have fortunately reduced the unquestioned employment of PP in Europe. PP should 
remain truly exceptional and, when used, the focus ought to be on research and 
evidence about benefits. Besides, one should make a serious attempt to apply RIAs. 
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4.   An analytical approach of the EU regulatory acquis 
4.1.   Analytical mapping of the regulatory acquis 
The economics of EU regulation simplify an analytical mapping of the regulatory acquis 
of the EU  internal market. The acquis of the internal market is the collection of all EU 
regulation (including the underlying free movements, mutual recognition and EU 
competition policy as indicated in Figure 1)  and related European standards as well as 
the relevant CJEU case law. Mapping the enormous internal market acquis in a 
conceptually understandable fashion is an interesting result in and by itself, since the 
‘regulatory acquis’ is usually regarded as a giant mass of rules resistant to overall 
assessment. Understanding the EU regulatory acquis, in particular its logic, is crucial. 
This is illustrated best by an important incident during the pre-accession period of the 
Central and East European countries. Their obligation was to incorporate the acquis of 
the internal market13 but no overview of that acquis, let alone, a genuine 
understanding of its logic, appeared to be available anywhere. When the Commission 
finally made a kind of inventory in the White Paper,14 it became a helpful tool for 
ticking off the work programme of the national parliaments, but little if any systematic 
understanding of the internal market logic was gained.  
The internal market regulatory acquis can be captured in a relatively simple matrix, 
derived from the public interest approach to regulation. The matrix consists, 
horizontally, of the five markets (goods, services, capital, labour, codified technology) 
and, vertically, of the four market failures (internalities, externalities, competition 
imperfections and public goods). One can fill the entries with examples of EU 
regulation that combine a market (say, services) and a market failure (say, internalities 
such as asymmetries of information).  
                                                     
13
 In the wide, conceptual sense. This was interpreted as incorporating 23 of the 30 negotiating 
chapters.  
14
 European Commission, 1995, The White paper: Preparation for the associated countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe for integration into the internal market of the Union, COM (95) 163, May. It contains 
23 chapters with lists totalling some 900 directives
, 
without almost any explanation and without any clue 
how these chapters and clusters inside them hang together.  
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What the matrix does not capture is redistributive regulation but this is a rarity in 
single market rules.15 The matrix shows the economic logic of the regulatory acquis, be 
it at a high level of generality. It clarifies that, in principle, the regulatory acquis is a 
functional one and may well serve the European public interest. It is only when 
zooming in on the specifics of each and every directive or regulation, on the basis of a 
proper RIA, that these generalities can be subjected to a hard test (Section 5).  
4.2. EU regulation, deepening and widening 
There is no authoritative ‘indicator’ or analysis establishing ‘gaps’ or the 
‘incompleteness’ of the EU internal market. The difficulty begins with the discrepancy 
between the economic internal market concept and the treaty concept. In three types 
of markets the treaty has always been weaker than for goods and capital: services, 
labour and intellectual property rights (linked to codified technology).  
Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) (like patents) are under unanimity and the relevant 
treaty article is and remains a huge drafting flaw.16 The EU patent brings together two 
important results from the economic literature: it applies to the entire internal market 
- stimulating R & D and innovation beyond what otherwise would be undertaken 
(Friebel, Koch, Prady and Seabright, 2006; Guellec and van Pottelsberghe, 2007; van 
Pottelsberghe, 2009) - and it is far cheaper than today, both at the outset and in terms 
of annual fees (current patenting in the EU is about five times as expensive as in the 
US). Therefore, the EU patent ‘gap’ severely hinders the internal market to serve 
effectively the attainment of (higher) growth and productivity trends, expressing 
central treaty objectives.  
                                                     
15
 There are two such exceptions. One works indirectly via ‘host country control’ in labour migration 
(and posted workers) – as it protects minimum wages in EU countries. The other is found in those 
agricultural rules not dealing with risk (like veterinary & phyto sanitary, or, fertilizers and pesticides) but 
with payments to farms.  
16 
That systems of ownership are a national prerogative was almost certainly understood by the 1957 
negotiators as referring solely to state ownership, not to IPRs like patents. 
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For labour, the treaty is also in the way but more subtly so. The crux of the matter is 
that the treaty speaks about the ‘free movement of workers’ but not in the list of free 
movements (where ‘persons’ are mentioned). The status of art. 45, TFEU (former art. 
39, EC) on the free movement of workers is clearly lower than the former art. 3, EC.  
The strict conditionality of the ‘free’ movement of workers under a broad form of host-
country control , essentially protecting (heavily regulated) national labour markets and 
their wage formation, cannot be a surprise . The TFEU defines the internal market (art. 
26, sub 2) again with reference to ‘persons’.  
Unlike the economic (and indeed also federal) notion of an internal market, there is no 
obvious basis to expect an ‘EU internal market for labour’ given these severe 
constraints at national level .  The free movement of workers is therefore ‘residual’ in 
the minds and practices of EU policy makers, and probably also for labour unions. For 
economists, this means that such migration flows might fill up shortages but do not, as 
a rule, exercise wage constraining or convergence effects or at most temporarily in 
specific segments of national labour markets.17 One can push this argument further in 
noting that cross-border migration in the EU is relatively small, even when taking the 
brief East-West surge of 2004-08 into account. This observation is usually seen as a 
sign of socio-cultural and language differences ‘naturally’ reducing such intra-EU 
migration. To some extent this is undoubtedly true – the ‘stay-put’ incentives in 
Europe are much more powerful than e.g. inside the US. Nevertheless, one should not 
ignore other reasons for low migration and these are due to sheltering national 
regulations, the welfare state and the EU acceptance of host country control in 
migration and the posted workers directive.18 In turn, these strong preferences for 
national labour market regulation (other than selected EU minimum requirements) 
and national redistributive arrangements render Europeanization of labour market 
regulation unlikely: it would not easily pass step 2 of the subsidiarity test (the need-to-
act-in-common), as cross-border externalities cannot be large.  
                                                     
17
 For empirical confirmation, see Kahanec & Zimmermann, 2009, analysing the economics of migration 
generated by the two Eastern enlargements.  
18
 See Pelkmans, 2006, 197-9, for a graphical proof that host country control can throttle or eliminate 
the demand for EU workers coming from low wage countries.  
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Also, the internal market diamond does not work like in other types of markets as 
neither competition policy nor mutual recognition is applied.19 The recent turmoil 
about instances where free movement of workers and a very wide interpretation of 
host country control conflict,20 illustrate explicitly what has long remained implicit in 
European integration. A partial and residual EU labour market is probably as far as one 
might expect to go both for reasons of a subsidiarity test and of socio-political 
legitimacy.  
On services, the treaty postulates free movement and the right of establishment 
applies. Nevertheless, it has long been neglected. Not only does the internal services 
market fail to ‘work properly’, it is a sensitive and complex area, also ignored by 
economists for too long. The selective approach for six transport modes only began to 
work after the CJEU ruling of 1985 (when the CJEU sided with the EP, against the 
Council). Financial services currently undergo a fourth generation of regulation. It is 
said that the 3rd generation rules for bank supervision (which were anyway not tight 
enough) spawned some 150 exceptions, derogations and variations in EU countries, 
overseen by a total of more than 55 regulators/ supervisors.  
The fourth generation of financial services regulation is seeking far better risk 
transparency, risk regulation (especially via higher capital requirements) and incentives 
to reconsider risk, together with novel bank resolution arrangements (see e.g. Lannoo, 
2011). ‘Good’ EU financial services regulation should root out, where appropriate, 
national divergences and costly fragmentation, while focussing primarily on risk 
management and transparency, tough supervision (which has to be Europeanized for 
some 50 cross-border banks and certain services), investor and consumer protection as 
well as ‘systemic’ financial stability overall.  
                                                     
19
 See also Kostoris Padoa Schioppa, 2003, for mutual recognition. Competition policy would run the risk 
of undermining constitutional rights to strike or to make collective agreements. 
20
 See the ECJ Laval (C-341-05, ruling December 2007) and Rueffert (C-346/06, ruling April 2008) cases. 
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The treaty can be in the way, however, in that the Meroni doctrine 21 prevents the 
proper solution for supervision: EU Agencies cannot be truly independent, like the ECB 
is (at least, not without treaty change). The same legal ‘freeze’ has shown up for 
services from network industries where the economic case for independent EU 
Agencies is strong in e.g. electricity & gas and air traffic control, for example. So far, 
unfortunately, the doctrine reduces the quality of EU solutions in financial markets and 
network industries, possibly other services too and undermines deeper market 
integration (Lavrijssen and Hancher, 2008; de Muyter, 2008; Chiti, 2009).  
In the internal market for professional services, it has also proved very difficult to make 
progress despite widespread anti-competitive practices hidden in self-regulation at the 
national level (Delimatsis, 2010).22 The CJEU Wouters case23 gave restrictive Dutch 
regulation the benefit of the doubt and thereby, once again, discouraged the 
Commission’s pursuit to open up these national markets.  
These examples show that, in services, the emergence of a deep internal market with a 
wide coverage of types of services is hindered in complex and subtle ways which are 
partly due to the treaty, partly to case law, partly to aspects of unanimity and of course 
due to vested interests as well. When the horizontal service directive (2006/123) was 
finally adopted – easily three decades too late - services other than the ones discussed 
above were to be addressed in a single piece of regulation based mainly on CJEU case 
law. Years of sometimes hectic debate revealed the profound ambivalence in the EU 
about an internal market of services and labour. Main discussion points included  
(a) the labour aspects,24 directly or indirectly, (b) the numerous derogations (even 
though the country-of-origin principle had been taken out!), (c) a few lingering 
                                                     
21
 The Meroni doctrine is in fact a doctrine of constitutional logic. Officially, it is based on an old case 
from the ECSC (Meroni , Case 9/56, Industrie Metallurgische vs, High Auhtority [ 1957 – 1958], ECR 133) 
but this case is a peculiar one and what matters in today’s debate is the prohibition for the EU level of 
re-delegating the powers received from the Member States to (EU) bodies which could regulate 
independently, without first ensuring a legal basis in the treaty for such delegation.  
22
 See COM(2004) 83 of 9 February 2004, Report on competition in professional services. 
23
 Case C-399/99, ruling 19 February 2002. See Vossestein, 2002. Delimatsis, 2010, shows that the 
services directive 2006/123 may well induce progress in e.g. EU-wide codes of conduct. 
24
 Note that Boeri, Nicoletti & Scarpetta, 2000 show empirically that restrictive labour market regulation 
is strongly correlated with restrictive services markets. 
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sensitivities25 and (d) the vexed problems of consumer and labour contracts as well as 
cross-border access to health services for patients. Again, a truly ‘deep’ and ‘wide’ 
internal services market is bound to be intrusive and has profound effects on what are 
regarded by many as ‘domestic’ traditional arrangements (be they social, legal, 
financial or institutional). This raises formidable questions of socio-political legitimacy.  
Besides these three broad domains, other ‘gaps’ in the internal market can be 
identified (as the Monti Report, op. cit., the 2007 Internal Market Review26 and the 
2011 Single Market Act27 have all done in somewhat different ways) but they are in a 
different category. One can see them as ‘unfinished business’, perhaps hard at first 
and easier today, or, responding to novel issues or new technology and new markets. 
They emerge due to a combination of legal and economic (neo-functionalist?) 
pressures, combined with political judgement by the Commission and other EU bodies. 
There are also ‘generation’ effects as dossiers such as ‘public procurement’ and 
‘mutual recognition’ of diplomas show, probably reflecting a tendency to move from a 
legalistic to a more economic, evidence-based (and ‘deeper’) approach. 
                                                     
25
 E.g. on services of general (economic or non-economic, even though the latter are not even part of 
the internal market) interest; on the posted workers directive 96/71, even though this directive 
remained explicitly untouched by the proposal.  
26
 See COM (2007) 724 of 20 Nov. 2007 and a series of accompanying COM and SEC documents; see also 
Pelkmans, 2010.  
27
 European Commission, Single Market Act, twelve levers to boost growth and strengthen confidence, 
COM(2011) 206 of 13 April 2011 and accompanying documents. 
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5.  Better EU regulation: an evidence-based, economic approach 
Starting from the framework indicated in Box 1, this section will provide the economic 
underpinning of the shift to systematic ‘better EU regulation’. This culminates in the 
crucial tool of RIAs (regulatory impact assessment) for new EU regulation as well as for 
revisions of parts of the regulatory stock. Since their introduction in mid-2003, 
Commission RIAs have grown into a leading and fairly rigorous instrument to impose 
Better Regulation principles, logic and economic cost-benefit analysis on every 
legislative proposal to Council and EP. Over time EU RIAs have improved significantly in 
quality and the 2009 Guidelines have become a standard in the world.28 
Good EU regulation maximizes the benefits while minimizing the (economic) costs of 
EU regulation in the single market. This is essentially done by transposing the 
economic logic of Box 1 into a sequential process of identification of EU (usually SHEC) 
objectives, policy options and a comparative cost-benefit analysis of those options. 
However, RIAs are not purely economic. What the EU calls ‘integrated assessment’, it 
combines long checklists of economic, environmental and social ‘impacts’. The RIA 
logic goes through six steps: (i) what is the EU policy problem?; (ii) what are the EU 
objectives to be pursued?; (iii) what are the policy options?; (iv) what are the likely 
impacts of those options (with checklists totalling more than 130 aspects); (v) how do 
the options compare?; (vi) how to best monitor and evaluate later, once the regulation 
is in force for a few years? Of course, this chapter cannot go into the very detailed 
Guidelines and the rationale of each and every step. The underlying rationales are five, 
three of them economic and the other two possibly having economic effects as well. 
First the latter two. Since RIAs (if well done) create easy access to quality information 
about data and to economic (and other) impacts of a range of options, while adhering 
to a rigorous approach of policy analysis, it disciplines the ‘regulatory state’ and 
unaccountable agencies; it should also make biased lobbying and unreliable pleading 
much more difficult because RIAs set the minimum standard in the policy debate.  
                                                     
28
 See European Commission, 2009, Impact Assessment Guidelines, and its many Annexes, at 
http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/docs/key_docs/iag_2009_en.pdf; see Renda, 2008 and the 
detailed EU Court of Auditors Report, 2010. 
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It might also help controlling the sprawling bureaucracy in ‘Brussels’ whether 
perceived or actually present, in particular, with respect to unnecessary ‘red tape’ for 
business or consumers. The economic arguments for supporting RIAs include:  
(a) competitiveness concerns of European business (avoiding ‘bad’ EU regulation);  
(b) micro-economic benefits of avoiding ‘bad’ regulation throttling entrepreneurial 
initiatives or competitive entry or raising costs without overcoming market failures (or 
doing so with disproportionate means); 
(c) macro-economic benefits: in moving from ‘bad’ to ‘good’ regulation, resources are 
freed for more productive application - if inappropriate regulation is widespread, one 
can empirically demonstrate that a shift to ‘best regulatory practices’ engenders a one-
time increment to GDP and possibly a higher trend growth of the economy (see e.g. 
Cotis, de Serres & Duval, 2010).  
The main problem with the EU RIAs is that the EU legislator (Council & EP) is not bound 
to adhere to RIA logic, although they have agreed to Better Regulation ideas in an 
Interinstitutional Agreement. The EU Court of Auditors Report (2010) shows clearly 
that RIAs plays some role in the EU legislator but a fairly modest one; drastic 
amendments are not subjected to a new RIA, the most painful example being the 
services directive 2006/123.  
In RIAs there has been more attention, recently, for alternative forms of regulation 
such as co-regulation or voluntary agreements and this may sometimes amount to a 
superior solution. Also, the EU has developed the Standard Cost Model in order to 
quantify the red-tape costs of EU legislation. To the extent that such red tape is 
avoidable, direct costs (especially for SMEs) can be cut and a major irritant for 
European business is removed. The EU target for red-tape cost reduction is 25 per cent 
by 2012, based on a huge exercise of estimating red tape costs of the EU single market 
regulatory acquis in 2006/7. The EU is likely to reach this target, for a total cost saving 
of €40 billion.29 Finally, inspired by Better Regulation programmes, the Commission has 
                                                     
29
 See the summary of all actions and their estimated cost savings in Commission Press Memo 10/654 of 
7 December 2010. In November 2010, the adopted actions amounted to € 27 billion.  
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also initiated a programme of identifying ‘market malfunctioning’ of certain ‘pockets’ 
in the single market. Detailed proposals to improve market functioning in certain retail 
branches where market power and other problems were playing a role is one concrete 
result of this new approach called ‘market monitoring’.30 What matters is whether EU 
regulation better serves allocative and dynamic efficiencies in the internal market, 
thereby promoting the very socio-economic goals European economic integration has 
always been pursuing: growth and productivity increase in the long run. 
 
6.  Blurring boundaries of national regulatory autonomy 
Insofar as internal market regulation and liberalization is goal-driven, an economic case 
can be made that national regulation – though autonomous - should be designed with 
the better functioning of the EU economy in mind. The internal market is seen as one 
of the principal means to achieve higher trend growth. National regulatory reform, in 
particular, in services and labour markets, is regarded as just as essential (Woelfl, 
Wanner, Kozluk and Nicoletti, 2009; Cotis et al, 2010; see also Kox & Lejour, 2005). 
Domestic reforms in services and labour markets can of course be driven by 
enlightened self-interest. But what if domestic political reasons prevent such insights 
(from economic analysis in the Lisbon policy process or the OECD) to be put in 
practice? Can the EU exercise go beyond peer pressure or perhaps ‘naming & shaming’ 
lists? Can one not maintain that reforms in all EU countries, even when governed by 
national autonomy, support an overall higher growth rate and external 
competitiveness in the EU so that positive externalities and complementarities are 
enjoyed; with the corollary that a refusal to reform in some EU countries implies 
negative effects for all? Can one not go further still and observe that the desired 
reforms found especially in labour and services markets suggest a direct link between 
                                                     
30
 See Ilzkovitz, Dierx & Sousa, 2008 for methodology and first application, and COM (2010) 355 of 5 July 
2010, Retail market monitoring report. See also COM(2009) 591 of 28 October 2009 on a better 
functioning food supply chain in the EU. 
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the lower potential of the internal market (due to gaps in precisely these areas) and 
the low reform record of some EU countries, exactly those with low records of 
productivity growth? It can be empirically shown as well that the euro area would 
function better if these domestic reforms would be undertaken (Pelkmans, Acedo & 
Maravalle, 2008).  
Sapir (2007, 407 ff) supports this view forcefully. ‘The case for coordinating product 
and capital market reforms on the one hand and labour market reforms on the other 
within each EU country increase the demand for labour and therefore facilitate 
reforms in the labour market. Equally, reforms of labour markets tend to facilitate the 
creation of new firms… Because countries share a common good, namely the single 
market,… better national labour markets operate, the easier it is to reform the single 
market and vice versa. Instead of a clear separation between the EU and the national 
remits, as was the case in the early days of the EC, there is an increasing overlap 
between the EU and national… domains’. 
A similar phenomenon can be observed about regulatory heterogeneity in the EU. It is 
worthwhile distinguishing  regulatory heterogeneity between Member States  from the 
diversity of preferences between Member States. Although the internal market deals 
with access to markets and competitive conduct (and structures at times), numerous 
rules, forms of red tape and other constraining factors of the corporate environment 
still differ a lot between all 27 member states. These interventions fall under national 
regulatory autonomy. To some degree this is inevitable and probably legitimate as 
well. It occurs in federal countries between provinces, cantons or states, too. The 
relevant question is: when is ‘diversity’ a sensible expression of different preferences 
and circumstances, and when is heterogeneity objectionable, as a costly fragmentation 
by autonomous rule making, not expressing diversity of preferences but merely 
technical or administrative differences? Diversity is underlying the subsidiarity 
principle, heterogeneity is not. It is important to appreciate the difference between 
the two. Given national regulatory autonomy and assuming for a moment that 
national objectives are equivalent (that is, there is no diversity of preferences), the 
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pure fact of decentralized decision-making will yield costly regulatory heterogeneity 
which has no economic purpose and is not rooted in diversity which ought to be 
respected under subsidiarity.  
Heterogeneity can be a reason why services exports in the EU cannot reach sufficient 
scale since the fixed costs of entering one national market have to be incurred again in 
the next market. If these costs per market are high enough, small national markets will 
be less well integrated as fewer entrants try. In national competition policy, all 
member states have gradually come to follow the EU rules and this is helpful. Still, 
European business (probably rightly) complains that the mere rejection of a European 
one-stop-shop below the EU merger thresholds (that is, being subjected to three, four 
or five merger authorities, if not more) can be very costly. For numerous aspects in the 
corporate regulatory environment, heterogeneity rather than diversity can be costly, 
too. It might well be that the expected internal market effects are in effect throttled by 
the too low weight of the internal market benefits against the remaining heterogeneity 
in the day-to-day reality for business in the single market. When Kox, Lejour & 
Montizaan, 2004, employed a heterogeneity index for services regulation in order to 
simulate the economic impact of the Bolkestein draft – the first time this was ever 
done – it was the reduction in regulatory heterogeneity between the member states (in 
bilateral gravity equations) which led to 0.3 per cent extra Gross National Product 
(GNP) and 30 to 60 per cent extra services trade in the internal market. This should be 
food for thought. In fact, Kox & Lejour, 2005, conduct a pure heterogeneity analysis, 
not an economic analysis of the impact of the barriers, their nature, scope and height 
in services markets.  
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7.  Conclusions 
In the vast domain of the internal market, ‘regulation’ is EU’s core business. Therefore, 
a good appreciation of European economic integration requires a sound analytical 
economic perspective of EU regulation. In the 25 years since the Single Act, the core 
questions of ‘why regulate (in) the internal market’, at ‘what level’, and ‘how’ have 
prompted much economic analysis of an ever more sophisticated nature. After quite 
some resistance, the rigorous logic of Better Regulation and even of cost-benefit 
analysis or other quantification has become routine in EU regulatory thinking, 
incorporated in RIAs and verified by a quasi-autonomous Impact Assessment Board 
(IAB) of the Commission.31 This refers mainly to risk regulation that is preponderant in 
the total stock of EU rules. The high number of RIAs each year (around 100 or more) 
and the quality control by the IAB have spawned a new, rapidly growing industry of 
economic analysis of EU regulation, in analogy with the evidence-based, more 
economic approach meanwhile adopted in EU competition policy. 
The increasing acceptance of economics and analytical rigour does not mean that 
there is no politics anymore in EU rule making. Nevertheless, it puts the subsidiarity 
test, proportionality and necessity (all basic requirements in EU law) on firmer 
analytical economic footing and offers a healthy discipline of the application of the 
precautionary principle. The acceptance of economic, evidence-based regulatory logic 
at EU level has caused a change of mindsets in the European Commission: regulation is 
now routinely discussed in terms of incentives, asymmetries of information, tight 
connection between instruments and objectives, various (and not merely one) policy 
options, quantification of benefits and costs, explicit red-tape alerts, market-based 
(instead of command-and-control) instruments and the notion of cost-effectiveness. 
This change of mindsets has not yet trickled down to the EU legislator to the same 
extent.  
                                                     
31
 See for instance SEC (2011) 126 of 24 January 2011, Impact assessment board report for 2010, on 
http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/docs. 
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Finally, the regulatory environment for business and consumers in the internal market 
is not solely determined by EU regulation, but by the blending of EU and national 
regulation. The regulatory autonomy of member states in an ever deeper and wider 
internal market has to be balanced against the possible consequence of worsening the 
sub-optimality of the functioning of the internal market. First, the key words here are 
(desirable) pro-competitive reforms and diversity, insofar as the segmentation is truly 
founded on diverse preferences between member states. Second, there is a lot of pure 
heterogeneity in the EU, not based on diverse preferences but, rather, an outcome of 
decentralized decision-making which is cumbersome to ‘undo’, but also costly when 
persisting. 
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